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Abstract: As the EU is moving towards a low carbon economy and seeks to further develop its
renewable energy policy, this paper quantitatively investigates the impact of plausible energy market
reforms from the perspective of bio-renewables. Employing a state-of-the-art biobased variant of
a computable general equilibrium model, this study assesses the perceived medium-term benefits,
risks and trade-offs which arise from an advanced biofuels plan, two exploratory scenarios of a
more ‘sustainable’ conventional biofuels plan and a ‘no-mandate’ scenario. Consistent with more
recent studies, none of the scenarios considered present significant challenges to EU food-security or
agricultural land usage. An illustrative advanced biofuels plan simulation requires non-trivial public
support to implement whilst a degree of competition for biomass with (high-value) advanced biomass
material industries is observed. On the other hand, it significantly alleviates land use pressures,
whilst lignocellulose biomass prices are not expected to increase to unsustainable levels. Clearly,
these observations are subject to assumptions on technological change, sustainable biomass limits,
expected trends in fossil fuel prices and EU access to third-country trade. With these same caveats in
mind, the switch to increased bioethanol production does not result in significant market tensions in
biomass markets.
Keywords: biomass; bio-energy; bio-chemicals; advanced technologies; agricultural production;
trade; land use; economic modelling; MAGNET model
1. Introduction
Over the last twenty years, the European Union (EU) has sought to gradually reduce its
dependence on fossil based fuels as part of its overall vision for a low carbon future. In 1997, the EU
set the tone in a key White Paper [1] for the encouragement of renewable energy sources (RES).
This initiative was followed closely by the Renewable Electricity Directive [2], the Biofuels Directive [3]
and the Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan [4]. More recently, under the auspices of the Renewable
Energy Directive (RED) [5], the EU set out an ambitious agenda to increase the RES share of gross
energy and transport fuel consumption by 2020 to 20% and 10%, respectively. Subsequently, Renewable
Energy Action Plans [6] for each of the Member States (MS) were introduced, with detailed roadmaps
on how to achieve said objectives.
From the perspective of EU energy security, these targeted support policies have undeniably
ushered in a more renewables intensive energy sector. Between 1990 and 2015, official data [7] reveals
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an upsurge in the RES share of gross electricity generation from 12.6% to 29.9%, largely due to major
investments in wind and solar. Importantly, the share of biomass in electricity generation (i.e., solid
biomass and biogas) has also risen dramatically from 0.4% to 4.7% over the same period. Similarly,
in the EU transport fuels sector, conventional- and advanced biofuels accounted for 4.0% and 1.2%,
respectively, of the 7.1% RES share achieved in 2016 [8].
The discussion on the viability of bioenergy, however, extends beyond energy security concerns to
encompass sustainability criteria (i.e., responsible biomass allocation, indirect land use change (iLUC)
and environmental ‘leakage’, reliable trade sources, feed and food security). Whilst measures such as
the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) [9] seek to roadmap credible criteria for the adoption of sustainable
biofuel usage, it is still claimed that EU imports of Asian (principally Indonesia and Malaysia) palm
oil for conventional biodiesel result in significant deforestation [10]. In addition, the promotion of
biomass to meet internal EU energy requirements appears inconsistent with the central tenet of the
bioeconomy strategy [11] which prioritizes high value added material uses before eventual recycling
and conversion to (lower value added) energy applications—the so-called ‘cascading’ principle [12,13].
In contrast, proponents of conventional biofuels talk up the benefits of co-product protein-based
animal feeds to livestock producers, which not only reduce EU dependence on essential sources of
imported soybean meal [14] but also alleviate iLUC impacts [15].
Looking ahead, the renewable energy agreement to 2030, foresees a greater role for advanced
biofuel technologies. More precisely, targets for RES shares in gross energy consumption and transport
are increased to 32% and 14%, respectively [16]. The expectation is that advanced biofuels, which rely
on residues and non-food lignocellulosic biomass inputs, will play a key role in responding to
sustainability concerns. Indeed, under auspices of the EU’s ‘European Advanced Biofuels Flightpath’
initiative, the promotion of advanced biofuel technologies even extends to the aviation sector.
Conventional biofuels, in contrast, will face stricter sustainability requirements, which will favor
bioethanol (vis-à-vis biodiesel) production.
The enumeration of these perceived benefits, risks and trade-offs requires a multisector analysis
which characterizes the sources of, and constraints on, available biomass, the pervasiveness of rival
biomass uses and the resource competition that arises from the links with the broader economy.
Moreover, the model should also consider access to third country markets to meet internal biomass
requirements. For these reasons, a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework is
an attractive option.
There are a number of insightful studies assessing EU biofuel policy [17–21] although the resulting
impacts on agricultural prices, production and land use, vary considerably, largely due to differences
in (inter alia) the time frames of each study and the scenario designs. Typically, modelling applications
which recognize extensive margin cropland conversion (i.e., from pastures or forests) and/or enhanced
modelling assumptions on land transfer and availability [22–24] report greatly reduced land market
pressures resulting from biofuels policies. Moreover, modelling improvements in the representation
of land yields, explicit accounting for second generation biofuels [25,26] and agricultural residue
potentials [25] have also been found to reduce the reported impacts on land pressures and associated
food prices and production effects arising from biofuels policies. In other studies [19,21], conventional
biofuel co-products are also explicitly modelled, the absence of which has been found to overstate
cropland conversion estimates arising from biofuel policies [23].
To the best of our knowledge, only one EU bioenergy foresight modelling exercise for
The Netherlands [27] expands the scope of bioenergy, encompassing not only bioelectricity and
advanced biofuel technologies, but also recognizing the competition for sources of non-food
lignocellulose biomass with latent biochemical and thermochemical material technologies. A further
refinement of this research is the explicit incorporation of expected technological advancements
in nascent bio-based sectors of the CGE model, which are taken from specialized bottoms-up
partial equilibrium models of the biobased energy (IMAGE-TIMER [28–30]) and chemicals sectors
(MARKAL-UU-NL [28]).
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In taking an EU-wide bioenergy focus, this research builds on [27]. Our study further deepens
the sector coverage to include biokerosene for aviation, whilst the electricity generation sectors in the
model now also includes non-biologically renewable, nuclear and fossil alternatives. To improve the
rigor of the study, official EU energy projections are incorporated into our contemporary baseline to
2030. In the context of the policy debate alluded to in the discussion above, the aim of the research is
to examine key aspects on the current policy debate surrounding bioenergy, through the careful design
and implementation of medium-term scenarios. Thus, the objective is to enumerate the trade-offs and
market tensions between food, feed, material, energy, land and other biomass markets that arise from
an advanced biofuels plan and two exploratory scenarios consisting of more sustainable conventional
biofuels within the current RED. A final stylized simulation examines the elimination of all EU
bioenergy support, with a particular focus on the implications for EU energy self-sufficiency. A key
underlying hypothesis is whether the current study concurs with more recent literature, which suggests
that the impact of bioenergy policies on relevant agricultural, land, feed and biomass markets is
potentially overstated.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data, modelling framework
and scenario design. Section 3 reports the results. Section 4 provides further discussion and concludes.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Model and Database
This study employs an advanced recursive dynamic variant of the well-known Global Trade
Analysis Project (GTAP) CGE market simulation model [31] and database [32], known as the Modular
Applied GeNeral Equilibrium Modelling Tool (MAGNET) [33,34]. With its unrivalled global coverage
of countries (140 regions) and markets (57 sectors), the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
database has become a key source of data for conducting economic impact assessments. In its latest
incarnation (version 10), the database includes detailed information on production, gross bilateral
trade flows, transport costs and trade protection data for a 2011 benchmark year. As a principal
secondary data source for the technology and demand structures within each country or region,
input-output (IO) national accounts data are used. Importantly, efforts by the GTAP center to
disaggregate certain bio-based activities (i.e., primary agriculture and food processing) from the highly
aggregated industry/commodity classifications in the IO data are undertaken, although inevitably,
more contemporary uses of biomass for feed, fuel and even material applications remain subsumed
within their parent industry classifications.
In terms of the model, the CGE approach typically employs constrained mathematical
optimization to represent decision making by agents (i.e., intermediate-, final- and investment
demands). Producers are assumed to operate under conditions of perfect competition and constant
returns to scale, whilst further market clearing and accounting equations ensure that supply equals
demand in all markets and national-income, -expenditure and -output flows are equal within each
country. A series of price linkage equations with exogenous tax (or tariff) variables capture the market
distortions on domestic and imported markets. It is assumed that savings rates in each economy are
a fixed share of regional income, whilst total investment in each region is allocated as a function of
relative changes in regional rates of return. A neoclassical ‘closure’ rule is assumed which implies
that imbalances on the capital account (i.e., regional savings less investment) are compensated by the
current account (exports minus imports), such that the balance of payments nets to zero.
The MAGNET model is an advanced derivative of the publically available GTAP model in that
it includes a number of non-standard state-of-the-art modelling features (e.g., agricultural policy
modelling, land usage, factor market rigidities, biofuels policy, nutrition, greenhouse gases etc.).
These ‘modules’ can be easily switched on/off, depending on the focus of the study. With this degree
of modelling flexibility, peer reviewed MAGNET impact assessments have appeared in a number
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of policy arenas including: land-use change [35]; EU domestic support [36]; conventional biofuel
policy [17,19]; Food Security [37] and Climate change [38].
With the current focus, a MAGNET biobased variant of the GTAP database encompasses
numerous sector splits from the GTAP parent sectors, combined with policy modelling. Figure 1 shows
the ‘new’ MAGNET biobased sectors in blue, with the standard GTAP sectors in white. The arrows
indicate the direction of biomass, bio-based energy and chemicals flows, whilst conventional biofuel
animal feed co-products are represented by dashed lines. A more detailed description of the data
construction is in [34].
The chosen model data disaggregation (Table 1) encompasses lignocellulose biomass sources
(i.e., residues, energy crops, pellets), agriculture, food, animal feed, conventional biofuel technologies,
advanced biofuels (including biokerosene) and biochemical biomass conversion technologies,
and bioelectricity. Non bio-based energy markets are represented by crude and processed fossil
fuels and several electricity technologies (fossil, nuclear and non-biological renewables). The regional
disaggregation has a mainly EU focus, whilst non-EU regions cover ‘large’ third-country distributors
of raw and processed biomass products on world markets and a European residual region of
EU neighbors.
Table 1. Study disaggregation of commodities and regions.
Commodity Disaggregation (66 Commodities):
Arable and horticulture (9): paddy rice, wheat; other grains; oilseeds; raw sugar; vegetables, fruits and nuts;
other crops; plant fibers; crude vegetable oil
Livestock and meat (7): cattle and sheep; wool; pigs and poultry; raw milk; cattle meat; other meat; dairy
Fertilizer (1): fertilizer
Other food and beverages (4): sugar processing; rice processing; vegetable oils and fats; other food
and beverages
Other ‘traditional’ bio-based (5): fishing; forestry; textiles, wearing apparel and leather products; wood
products; paper products and publishing
Bio-mass supply (10): energy crops; residue processing; pellets; by-product residues from rice; by-product
residues from wheat; by-product residues from other grains; by-product residues from oilseeds; by-product
residues from horticulture; by-product residues from other crops; by-product residues from forestry
Bio-based liquid energy (5): 1st generation biodiesel; 1st generation bioethanol; 2nd generation thermal
technology biofuel; 2nd generation biochemical technology biofuel; bio-kerosene
Bio-based industry (4): lignocelluose sugar; biochemical (fermentation) conversion of sugar biomass to
polylactic acid chemicals; biochemical (fermentation) conversion of bioethanol to polyethylene chemicals;
thermochemical conversion of biomass to chemicals
Bio-based and non-bio-based animal feeds (3): 1st generation bioethanol by-product distillers dried grains
and solubles (ddgs); crude vegetable oil by-product oilcake; animal feed.
Renewable electricity generation (3): bioelectricity; hydroelectric; solar and wind
Fossil fuels and other energy markets (10): crude oil; petroleum; gas; gas distribution; coal; coal-fired
electricity; gas-fired electricity; nuclear electricity; electricity distribution; kerosene
Other sectors (5): chemicals, rubbers and plastics; other manufacturing; aviation; other transport;
other services
Regional Disaggregation (17 Regions):
EU members (12): France (FRA); Germany (GER); Italy (ITA); United Kingdom (UK); Ireland (IRE); Austria
(AUT), Spain, Greece, Portugal (Rest of the Mediterranean); Sweden, Finland, Denmark (Scandinavia),
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (BeNeLux), Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia (Baltics); Poland, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary (EU East); Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta (Rest of EU South)
Non EU regions (5): Rest of Europe (RestEurope); North America (NoAmerica); Central and South America
(SouandCentAme); African continent (Africa); Asia and Oceania (ROW).
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2.2. Baseline
The baseline and scenarios implemented here do not represent all of the exact elements of the
recent EU energy package finalized in June 2018, but rather resort to reasonable assumptions based on
the existing 2020 RED and the proposals prior to the final agreement. Notwithstanding, the agreed
targets are close to those modelled here such that the underlying message of the paper is not expected
to change.
In this study a medium-term status quo baseline is implemented from 2011 to 2030 over three
time periods (2011–2015; 2015–2020; 2020–2030) which follows expected macroeconomic- (real GDP,
population), biophysical- (land productivities) and energy- (fossil fuel prices, energy consumption
and production trends) trends. Furthermore, attention is given to environmental- (region-wide GHG
reductions) and biomass-policies (Common Agricultural Policy, bioenergy support, trade liberalization)
based on respected secondary data sources. A detailed discussion of these assumptions and modelling
approach is available online in [34], although pertinent assumptions with respect to energy market
trends are briefly discussed here.
Following [17], fiscal-neutral first- and second-generation biofuel mandates consistent with the
EU’s RED are assumed. In the baseline, the EU-wide average first generation biofuel mandate reaches
7% by 2020 and is maintained to 2030. Taking a time-linear approach, advanced biofuel blending
mandates of close to zero in the benchmark year (2011) to 1.5% in 2030, are assumed. To capture the
spirit of the ‘European Advanced Biofuels Flightpath’ initiative, biokerosene sold to the kerosene
(blending) sector increases up to 0.5% by 2030 (our 0.5% assumption should be considered as an upper
limit. Indeed, given the cost disadvantage of bio kerosene next to fossil based kerosene [39], it is noted
in that, “ . . . only after 2035 (will) biofuels (bio-kerosene) slowly start penetrating the aviation fuel
mix” [36], p. 64). As part of the baseline design [40], electricity generation (including bioelectricity)
consistent with the RED and projected residential demand for energy to the year 2030 are presented in
Table 2.
Table 2. EU private energy consumption and gross electricity generation output by technology (%).
EU Residential Energy Intensity 2011–2015 2015–2020 2020–2030
Energy composite −7.0 −9.3 −17.2
Electricity source: - - -
Coal 1.6 −9.4 −26.7
Gas −25.0 −0.4 11.9
Nuclear −4.3 −10.9 0.6
Hydroelectric −2.8 3.6 0.9
Wind and solar 88.0 63.3 36.1
Bioelectricity 33.1 4.2 44.9
Source: [40].
Finally, fossil fuel price trends (historical and projected) are taken from [41]. The exact price
assumptions used for global fossil fuels prices are displayed in Table 3.
Table 3. Fossil fuel prices between 2011 and 2030.
Fuel Type Units 2011 2015 2020 2030
Coal Australia $/mt 94.6 69.6 55.4 60.0
Crude oil, avg, spot $/bbl 90.8 69.8 62.9 80.0
Gas ave. $/mmbtu 9.1 7.4 5.7 7.7
Source: [41] and own assumptions.
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2.3. Scenarios
Each policy scenario deviates from the baseline over the decade of 2020–2030. A first illustrative
simulation assesses an advanced biofuels (AB) action plan inspired by the EU reform proposals to
the RED. Specifically, conventional biofuel blending rates are assumed to fall from an EU28-wide
average of 7% in 2030 to 3.8% in 2030, whilst advanced biofuel blending rates rise from an EU28-wide
average of 1.5% in 2030 to 3.6% by 2030. This advanced biofuel mandate is an actual measure
(vis-à-vis double-counted virtual measure). In the legislature, advanced biofuel sources of biomass
include lignocellulose biomass, algae and even municipal solid waste, although only the first of these
biomass types is currently contemplated within the MAGNET model global database (see Figure 1).
The proposals also include further provisions for increasing usage of biomass in heating, although this
is also not currently included in the MAGNET dataset.
In seeking to reinforce the sustainability criterion underlying the EU’s first-generation biofuels
policy, there was ongoing debate within the European Parliament to phase out palm-oil based
biodiesels [10], which was eventually formalized within the June 2018 agreement with a complete
withdrawal of palm-oil usage in conventional biofuels by 2030. Against this background, assuming
the same conventional biofuel mandates as in the baseline, two exploratory scenarios are run. In the
‘moderate’ sustainability scenario, all EU imports of palm oil originating from Asia are now eliminated
(POE). This is modelled by fixing the bilateral import quantity and endogenising the corresponding
tariff. It is estimated that approximately half is used in biodiesel [8]. Since the data does not source
imports by specific user, the scenario design eliminates all imports, which results in an overestimation
of the resulting output, price and trade impacts. Furthermore, by exogenously controlling extra-EU
palm imports from Asia, one cannot examine the possible substitution effects of increased palm oil use
in other bio-industrial sectors. In the more ‘extreme’ sustainability scenario, the EU’s first-generation
biofuels mandate is now solely covered by bioethanol (ETH).
Finally, a no bioenergy support (NoS) scenario on all EU bioenergy types (i.e., biofuels,
biokerosene, bioelectricity), examines the impacts on the EU’s energy self-sufficiency and the resulting
impacts on biomass related markets. A full summary of the differences between these scenarios and
the baseline assumptions is provided in Table 4.
Table 4. Scenario overview, changes compared to baseline (period 2020–2030).
SCENARIOS
BASELINE AB ETH POE NoS
Biofuel blending:
Conventional 7% 3.8% As baseline As baseline 0%
Advanced 1.5% 3.6% As baseline As baseline 0%
Palm oil imports no restriction As baseline As baseline
EU imports
from Asia
Eliminated
As baseline
EU conventional
biofuel sources
Bio-ethanol and
bio-diesel As baseline
Only
Bioethanol As baseline As baseline
3. Results
A full discussion of the baseline results is given in [34]. In this section, results are presented
for the scenarios in comparison with the baseline for the period 2020–2030. The value estimates are
in 2011 constant prices. From a macroeconomic perspective, the AB proposal, plus the exploratory
POE and ETH scenarios lead to small relative real EU GDP falls (approximately −0.01%). There is an
estimated baseline EU biofuels budgetary cost of €9971 million in 2030 associated with the current
RED (Table 5). The encouragement of advanced generation biofuels under the AB plan, requires a
significant additional EU investment of €8232 million of public support compared with the baseline
(Table 5), although this figure is very much dependent on the assumptions of the costs for the different
bioenergy pathways and fossil fuel prices adopted in this study. Similarly, POE and ETH scenarios
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result in marginal total biofuel budgetary cost increases of €112 million and €986 million, respectively.
In contrast the efficiency gains arising from the removal of all biofuels support (NoS, i.e., €10 billion
budget saving) increases EU real growth, although in proportional terms, this effect is small (i.e., less
than 0.05%).
Table 5. Fiscal and quantity impacts of biofuels support policy.
BASELINE AB ETH POE
Subsidy rates (€/L) in 2030
Bioethanol 0.61 0.51 1.17 0.64
Biodiesel 0.59 0.45 0.00 0.63
Biochem2G 3.01 3.33 3.06 3.01
Thermal2G 3.01 3.48 3.07 3.01
Biokerosene 4.14 4.41 4.13 4.14
Budgetary costs (€ millions 2011 prices) in 2030
Bioethanol 388 179 3852 426
Biodiesel 2560 1007 0 2634
Biochem2G 3003 7943 3046 3003
Thermal2G 2938 7928 2981 2939
Biokerosene 1081 1146 1078 1081
Total 9970 18,203 10,957 10,083
Liters (millions) in 2030
Bioethanol 636 351 3292 666
Biodiesel 4339 2238 0 4181
Biochem2G 998 2385 995 998
Thermal2G 976 2278 971 976
Biokerosene 261 260 261 261
Total 7210 7512 5520 7082
3.1. Output and Market Prices
The production volume impacts in each of the scenarios compared with the baseline are presented
in Table 6.
Under the advanced biofuel proposals, conventional biofuel production falls 46.2%, with a
concomitant advanced biofuel output expansion of 136.7%. This reorientation is reflected clearly in the
feedstock markets. EU output volume falls in oilseeds (−3.9%) and sugar beet (−1.9%) and animal
feed co-products (−8.7%). This is accompanied by strong output volume rises (from smaller bases) in
non-food lignocellulosic biomass such as pellets, residues and energy crops (63.5%, 23.3% and 6.1%,
respectively), although alternative material uses of said biomass are crowded out. For example, relative
output reductions are observed for polylactic polymers (−0.3% or −€0.35 million) and polyethylene
polymers (−1.0% or −€0.09 million) and thermochemical biomass conversion technologies (−3.9%
or −€0.42 million), as well as biokerosene (−0.5% or −€4.7 million) and bioelectricity (−7.1% or
−€1.2 billion). The output gap in electricity generation is met by non-biological renewables and fossil
fuels in equal measure (approximately 1%). Advanced thermal and biochemical fuel technologies
volumes rise by over 130% (equivalent to a relative rise of 2684 million liters—Table 5).
Examining market prices, the effects are moderate, largely due to access to third-country biomass
trade (see next section). Thus, price rises are observed for EU advanced biofuels (2.5%) and price
falls for conventional biofuels (−2.1%). Similarly, the price variations in upstream feedstocks for
both advanced and conventional biofuels are muted (i.e., no greater than 5%). Resulting cost push
effects are witnessed in the bio-kerosene and bioelectricity markets (3.6% and 2.0%, respectively),
whilst electricity price impacts are insignificant.
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Table 6. EU28 market impacts in bio-based and energy sectors vs baseline (2020–2030).
Title Baseline 2030 1
Output (%) Market Prices (%)
AB ETH POE NoS AB ETH POE NoS
Agriculture:
CEREALS 2 61,480 0.3 1.5 −0.1 0.1 −0.3 0.6 0.0 0.1
oilseed 14,754 −3.8 −7.3 1.6 −6.7 −1.4 −3.1 0.7 −3.2
sugar 3930 −1.9 23.8 0.3 −4.0 −0.5 8.1 0.2 −2.1
CROPS 200,888 −0.4 0.5 0.1 −0.3 −0.1 0.1 0.1 −0.5
LIVESTOCK 169,774 −0.3 −0.4 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.0 −0.6
AGRIC 370,600 −0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 −0.5
Food:
MEAT 204,450 −0.3 −0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 −0.2
DAIRY 207,914 −0.2 −0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.0 −0.4
FOOD 1,067,203 −0.2 −0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.3
Other biomass sources:
energy crop 288 6.1 −0.4 −0.0 −15.6 5.1 0.0 0.0 −9.0
residue 13,588 23.3 0.2 −0.0 −46.8 3.5 −0.1 0.0 −4.5
pellet 419 63.5 0.3 0.0 −54.5 1.7 −0.1 0.0 −2.5
BIOMASS 14,182 24.5 0.2 −0.0 −46.2 3.5 −0.1 0.0 −4.6
crude veg oil 15,511 −8.9 −17.7 4.6 −16.9 −2.3 −5.0 1.1 −5.3
Bio-industry:
ligno Sugar 10 −14.6 8.0 0.3 26.1 2.0 −0.1 0.0 −2.6
polyethylene 9 −1.0 −6.6 −0.1 8.5 −2.0 5.6 0.3 −8.8
polylactic acid 125 −0.3 −1.5 0.0 4.7 0.1 0.2 0.0 −0.2
thermochem2G 11 −3.9 −5.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Biofuels and co-products:
bioethanol 1G 766 −44.8 420.1 5.5 −93.6 −4.6 15.1 0.6 −18.2
biodiesel 1G 4657 −48.7 −99.6 −3.4 −96.7 −1.9 −4.1 2.0 −4.2
BF1G 5426 −46.2 −29.4 −2.3 −95.0 −2.2 −1.5 1.9 −6.1
thermal2G 3121 138.7 −0.3 −0.0 −99.7 2.3 −0.1 0.0 −2.9
biochem2G 3199 133.1 −0.6 −0.0 −99.7 2.6 −0.1 0.0 −3.2
BF2G 6298 136.7 −0.1 −0.0 −99.7 2.5 −0.1 0.0 −3.0
bkerosene 960 −0.5 −0.1 −0.0 −98.5 3.6 −0.1 0.0 −4.6
ddgs 184 −30.4 401.8 5.4 −69.8 20.7 −52.8 −2.8 83.7
oilcake 6067 −8.3 −16.7 4.4 −15.9 4.3 9.0 −1.9 9.3
FEED 6251 −8.7 −6.3 4.4 −16.8 4.8 6.9 −2.0 11.8
Fossil fuels:
coal 24,224 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9
oil 108,058 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 −0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4
gas 33,799 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4
petroleum 602,394 0.0 −0.0 −0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
Electricity generation:
coal-fired 48,473 0.7 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
gas-fired 59,126 0.9 −0.1 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
nuclear 61,970 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.9
hydroelectric 25,168 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0
wind/solar 107,345 0.7 0.2 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.1
bioelectric 17,138 −7.1 0.3 −0.0 −26.8 2.0 −0.1 0.0 −2.8
1 Base 2030 values in € millions, 2011 constant prices. 2 Block capitals denote aggregate activities.
In both the POE and ETH scenarios, food price and macroeconomic impacts are negligible,
whilst the market impacts in the POE scenario are largely restricted to the first-generation biofuel
production chain. In the POE scenario, EU biodiesel output volume falls 3.4% compared with the
baseline (−146 million liters (Table 5)), with a concomitant rise in bioethanol output volume of 5.5%
(35 million liters (Table 5)). In the baseline, it is estimated that bioethanol and biodiesel production
reaches 635 million liters and 4.3 billion liters, respectively, by 2030. Similarly, baseline advanced
generation biofuels production under an assumed 1.5% mandate is approximately 2 billion liters
in 2030. This compares with 2017 estimates of conventional biofuel production of approximately
2.6 billion liters [8]. This same report also states that by 2021, advanced biofuels could reach 200 million
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liters, although for the reforms to the RED, “the consumption of advanced biofuels must increase
significantly from 2020” [8], (p. 3). Despite the fall in biodiesel output, the loss of imported crude
vegetable oil from Asia is substituted with EU produced oilseeds and crude vegetable oil feedstocks,
which increase 1.6% and 4.6%, respectively. The expansion in bioethanol production has only moderate
effects on upstream sugar beet production (0.3%), suggesting greater import dependence (see next
section). With the rise in EU crude vegetable oil and bioethanol production, EU oilcake and distillers
dried grains and soluble (DDGS) co-products output rises 4.4% and 5.4%, respectively. With increased
internal demand for first generation feedstocks of oilseeds, crude vegetable oil and sugar beet, market
prices rises are moderate (0.7%, 1.1% and 0.2%, respectively), which slightly pushes up costs in
biodiesel (0.6%) and bioethanol (2.0%).
In the ETH scenario, there is four-fold increase in EU bioethanol production (420%, or 2666 million
liters (Table 5)) with a concurrent collapse in (the larger) biodiesel sector (−4319 million liters (Table 5)),
leading to a 29.4% contraction in EU conventional biofuel production. EU oilseed and crude vegetable
oil production declines 7.4% and 17.7%, respectively. Similarly, increased bioethanol demand for
biomass feedstock has a marked effect on EU sugar beet production (24%) and even cereals production
(1.5%). An associated resource-conflict that arises is that less bioethanol is reserved for biochemical
applications (e.g., polyethylene polymer output volume declines −6.6%), whilst increased processed
sugar uptake in bioethanol is consequently diverted away from polylactic polymer production (−1.5%),
part of which is met by increased supply of lignocellulosic sugar (8.0%—from a small base). In all
the experiments, there are strong impacts on animal feed co-products. As a bioethanol by-product,
rising DDGS production (402%) does not compensate crude vegetable oil co-product oilcake falls
(−16.7%), generating an aggregate animal-feed by product production fall of −6.3%.
As expected, EU bioethanol prices rise 15.1%, reflecting the cost increases in sugar beet (8.1%)
and cereals (0.6%) feedstocks, whilst the ethanol using polyethylene sector exhibits a price rise of 5.6%.
Biodiesel, crude vegetable oil and oilseeds market prices fall −4.1%, −5.0% and −3.1%, respectively.
DDGS market prices fall 53%, although with 9% rises in oilcake prices, composite co-product animal
feed prices rise 6.9%.
In the NoS scenario, there is an output value loss of €11.4 billion in combined conventional
and advanced biofuels and close to €945 million in the bio-kerosene sector (Table 6). As a result,
output contractions are observed in conventional biofuels feedstocks (oilseeds, sugar), advanced
biofuel feedstocks (e.g., energy crops, residues, pellets), and biofuel by-product animal feeds.
Elsewhere, there is evidence of a redistribution of biomass into nascent EU bio-chemical (polyethylene,
polylactic acid) and thermochemical lignocellulose biomass conversion technologies, although in value
terms, the relative increase is limited (€7 million and less than €1 million, respectively).
Bioenergy feedstock market prices fall for EU oilseeds (−3.2%) and sugar beet (−2.1%), although
cereals price changes are negligible. Elsewhere, non-food lignocellulosic biomass prices fall between
−2.5% (pellets) to −9.0% (energy crops). Falling feedstock prices result in market price falls in
contracting biofuels sectors, whilst the increased availability of rechanneled biomass reduces per
unit costs in advanced biochemical sectors, most notable in the case of the polyethylene sector
(−8.8%). In contrast, reduced availability of animal feed co-products increases market prices for
oilcake (9.3%) and DDGS (83.7%). The removal of all biofuel mandates registers non-trivial impacts in
the energy market. With the fall in EU bioelectricity output volume (−26.8%), electricity generation
from wind/solar renewables (in the EC baseline [38], it is expected that hydroelectricity will not expand
beyond current physical capacity limits (see also [38], p. 974)), whilst for political reasons, nuclear
power capacity does not expand (see Supplementary Materials), coal-fired and gas-fired power stations
rises 4.3%, 3.6% and 2.7%, respectively, without any significant market price rises (i.e., below 1%).
3.2. Trade Effects
Table 7 shows the value changes in trade in millions of euros (2011 constant prices) compared with
the baseline. The extra EU trade balance is calculated as exports minus imports. A positive change in
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this trade balance indicates increases in exports and/or decreases in imports. Under AB, conventional
biofuel extra-EU imports fall between 40–50%, with an associated trade balance improvement of
€484 million and a total trade balance improvement in conventional biofuel feedstocks of cereals,
oilseeds, sugar beet and crude vegetable oil totaling €1325 million. As an essential element in meeting
to EU’s increased advanced biofuels mandate, extra-EU imports of pellets and processed advanced
biofuels results in trade balance deteriorations of −€250 million and −€1233 million, respectively,
whilst the crowding out of EU produced biokerosene production leads to a −€554 million to maintain
the kerosene mandate. Fossil fuel trade balances are largely unaffected. The loss of EU produced
oilcake feed is compensated by a 6% increase in extra-EU imports leading to a €220 million trade
balance deterioration.
In the POE scenario, the elimination of extra-EU palm oil imports from Asia results in a 22.0%
fall in total extra-EU imports of crude vegetable oil and an associated trade balance improvement of
€732 million. To bridge the shortfall, there are relative rises in extra-EU imports of oilseeds (4.7%),
sugar beet (0.9%), bioethanol (5.4%) and biodiesel (1.1%). Interestingly, the total associated trade
balance deterioration from these import rises (−€459 million) is less than the EU trade balance saving
noted above. Intra-EU trade trends for bioethanol and biodiesel follow the output trends noted
in Section 3.1 above, whilst reduced EU biodiesel capacity and greater EU import dependence on
bioethanol stifle extra-EU exports of both. The output volume rise in EU produced animal feed
co-products leads to a trade balance improvement of €113 million.
In the ETH scenario, intra-EU trade and extra-EU imports of biodiesel disappear, with an
associated EU trade balance improvement of €762 million (Table 7), although this is accompanied by a
rise in extra-EU imports of bioethanol of 810.4% and an EU trade balance deterioration of €1656 million.
Extra-EU imports fall (EU trade balances improve) for crude vegetable oil 29.9% (€1000 million) and
oilseeds 16.4% (€1422 million) respectively; whilst internal EU surpluses are diverted onto world
markets. In contrast, notable rises in extra-EU imports of bioethanol feedstocks of raw sugar (50.8%)
and cereals (4.4%) lead to trade balance deteriorations of €505 million and €196 million, respectively.
With the production drop in EU oilcake animal feed (from biodiesel), extra-EU import dependence on
this protein based animal feed rises 11.3%, with an associated €416 million trade balance deterioration.
In the NoS scenario, intra-EU trade and extra-EU imports of conventional biofuels, advanced
biofuels and biokerosene collapses, with associated external balance improvements of €1033 million,
€1290 million and €1102 million, respectively. In conventional biofuel feedstock of oilseeds,
crude vegetable oil and sugar beet, as well as pellets, the same aforementioned trends arise,
with resulting trade balance improvements of €1388 million, €1006 million, €283 million and
€353 million, respectively. Unlike the AB scenario, EU cereals trade remains unaffected due to the real
income driven rises in internal EU cereals demand. In the case of protein-based oilcake, there is an
additional reliance on extra-EU imports (13.7%) to meet internal EU shortages resulting in a trade
balance deterioration of −€503 million.
Reduced bioenergy and associated biomass usage is accompanied by extra-EU import rises of
2.8%, 1.5%, 0.7% and 0.4% in coal, crude oil, gas and refined petroleum extra-EU imports, respectively.
In value terms, this equates to trade balance deteriorations of −€419 million, −€5133 million,
−€564 million and −€459 million, respectively. Netting out these energy related trade balance shifts,
the EU requires an additional €253 million in extra-EU imports from the abolition of bioenergy
support instruments.
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Table 7. EU Trade volumes in constant prices (2011, €millions).
Intra-EU Trade (€ millions 2011 Constant Prices) Extra-EU Trade (€ Millions 2011 Constant Prices)
Baseline Intra-EU Trade vs. Baseline Baseline Baseline Extra-EU Trade Balance vs. Baseline
Trade 2030 AB ETH POE NoS Exports 2030 Imports 2030 AB ETH POE NoS
Traditional crop feedstocks, lignocellulose biomass, processed intermediates and biomass by-products:
CEREALS 12,263 14 285 −6 −16 9410 4437 43 −196 −1 −23
oilseed 4825 −242 −466 97 −435 731 8646 701 1422 −409 1388
Sugar beet 72 −1 7 0 −2 4 12 72 −505 −22 283
pellet 392 262 1 0 −209 12 141 −250 9 0 353
crude veg oil 5593 −480 −967 560 −931 1156 3337 509 1000 732 1006
feed by-prod 1791 −219 −426 109 −417 519 3652 −220 −416 113 −503
Bioenergy:
bioethanol 1G 11 −4 33 0 −10 61 193 114 −1656 −13 278
biodiesel 1G 250 −115 −250 −9 −249 74 729 370 762 −15 755
BF1G 261 −119 −217 −9 −259 135 921 484 −893 −28 1033
thermal2G 19 26 0 0 −19 3 213 −612 −17 −1 635
biochem2G 20 26 0 0 −20 3 227 −621 −16 0 655
BF2G 39 52 0 0 −39 6 440 −1233 −33 −1 1290
bkerosene 10 0 0 0 −10 2 53 −554 28 −1 1102
Other energies:
Coal 1066 2 5 0 3 123 14,791 −96 −59 0 −419
Crude oil 15,649 89 88 0 61 2643 353,882 148 −1677 3 −5133
Gas 10,842 25 0 0 20 1904 80,737 −113 −266 1 −564
Petroleum 98,163 84 91 −11 116 76,851 120,587 2 −30 8 −459
electricity 27,474 −26 13 0 −107 19,750 5807 −16 3 0 −109
Notes: Block capitals denote aggregate activities.
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3.3. Land Use
The impacts on land usage (in km2) are shown in Figure 2. As a general observation, neither the
AB proposal, nor the three exploratory scenarios have a major impact on aggregate land usage in the
EU. On the other hand, there is evidence that, at the margin, biofuel policies have a clear impact on EU
and global land usage for oilseeds (for biodiesel) and raw sugar (for bioethanol) cropping areas.
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On eliminating extra-EU Asian imports of palm oil (POE), the need for domestic substitutes
(and imports) has clear implications for land usage in the EU. Thus, oilseeds land usage rises
1442 km2 (1.1%) to fill the gap from lost Asian palm oil imports. The relatively minor impact of
increased bioethanol production on EU sugar beet land area (31 km2 or 0.2%) is indicative of the
EU’s preferred dependence on third-country sources of raw feedstocks and processed bioethanol.
With a strong rise in oilseeds area, there is a switch away from cereals land (despite increased uptake
from bioethanol) and from livestock land to cropland. As a result of the import ban, in the non-EU
regions, the reduction in oilseeds land area in the ROW region (includes Asia) is −1522 km2 or −0.2%
(not shown). On the other hand, higher extra-EU imports of oilseeds from substitute third-countries
increases the global area sown by 4816 km2 (0.2%).
In the ETH scenario, the EU land area devoted to oilseeds falls −7074 km2 (−5.6%). On the other
hand, in cereals and sugar beet cropping areas there is an additional estimated EU land uptake of
7268 km2 (1.1%) and 2034 km2 (13.5%), respectively. As indicated in the POE scenario, there is an
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output gap in EU bioethanol production, which is bridged by third-country imports. Consequently,
an additional 874 km2 (0.5%) of sugarcane land is sown in South and Central America (not shown),
with a corresponding global increase of 3000 km2 (0.8%). Similarly, there is a relative reduction in third
country oilseed land area sown, such that global oilseeds land area contracts by −38,714 km2 (−1.4%).
In the NoS scenario, the EU land areas sown for oilseeds and sugar beet decline by −6050 km2
(−4.8%) and −383 km2 (−2.5%) respectively (in the EU, these land use falls are slightly less than
the ETH scenario because of demand driven rises for agrifood products due to the slight rise in EU
macroeconomic growth in the NoS scenario). Despite the collapse of bioethanol, a portion of this
land reduction is re-diverted into cereals (2479 km2 or 0.4%), whilst the livestock sector also witnesses
greater uptake of land (2699 km2 or 0.3%) at the expense of cropping activities. Lignocellulose energy
cropland area contracts by −104 km2 (−10.9%), although overall, total EU land usage is reduced
by a (moderate) 908 km2 (−0.1%). As expected, oilseed land areas in non-EU regions falls by a
similar magnitude to the ETH scenario, whilst sugarcane land area in South and Central America
falls by 318 km2 (−0.2%). Globally, oilseed, sugar and lignocellulose energy cropland contract −1.3%,
−0.2% and −3.7%, respectively; whilst land reallocation effects lead to a very slight rise (0.2%) in the
cereals land area.
4. Discussion
In June 2018, the European Union (EU) finalized an agreement to further decarbonize its energy
sector. Under the auspices of the advanced biofuels (AB) plan, biomass will continue to contribute
as a part solution, although it must balance energy security concerns with sustainability criteria.
From the broad perspective of EU food security, all bioenergy scenarios are consistent with previous
studies in that they exert only limited impacts on EU agricultural land usage [42–45] and EU agrifood
production [43,46]. Indeed, this finding supports the observation made in the introduction regarding
the impacts of explicitly accounting for second generation biofuels, biofuel by-products, extensive land
transfer, land yields and (non-food) residue potentials in economic modelling studies.
Examining the AB proposal, the study supports the sustainability claim that increased usage
of non-food cellulosic feedstocks in advanced biofuels necessitates only moderate increases in land
uptake, alleviates land use pressures both in the EU and non-EU regions through reductions in
cultivated oilseeds and sugar beet areas and improves the EU’s biomass and conventional biofuels
trade balance. The AB scenario does require significant capacity increases in high-energy crops,
pellets and residues, although the evidence here corroborates the analysis of [42]. More precisely,
if EU supply chains for biomass develop satisfactorily (i.e., respect biodiversity, conservation and
erosion), coupled with available EU access to third-country imports of non-food cellulosic feedstocks,
the resulting price rise for advanced biofuels is not expected to generate prohibitive bottlenecks
in reaching EU mandates. This result therefore challenges fears of overoptimistic expectations of
technological enhancements in advanced biofuels [47], although further research into ‘bottoms-up’
engineering estimates of technological change would help ensure a more solid basis for setting out
plausible ‘real’, rather than (double-counted) ‘virtual’, mandates.
The AB does, however, face potential challenges. Firstly, subject to the technology change
assumptions of this study, the implementation of a more sustainable energy plan is found to carry a
significant taxpayer cost, although this is potentially overstated since the fossil fuel price assumptions
by 2030 are toward the lower end. Moreover, there are stakeholder concerns that a strategy of
premature substitution of conventional biofuels with advanced biofuel alternatives could irrevocably
harm investor confidence in the entire biofuels sector [15]. Another issue relating to AB is the broader
notion of public policy incoherence. Contrary to the EU’s current strategy toward innovative high-value
biomass conversion technologies [11], a resource trade-off is observed as nascent biochemical and
thermochemical material conversion technologies contract, although this effect is not unduly strong.
Furthermore, a bio-energy trade-off is observed, as increases in advanced biofuels volumes compromise
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bioelectricity production through the rechanneling of pellets, although this finding does not account
for the compensating role of organic and municipal waste in (bio-) electricity production.
In the two exploratory conventional biofuels scenarios of conventional ethanol only (ETH)
and palm oil elimination (POE), as with AB, there is little evidence to support biomass bottlenecks
(i.e., significant price rises) in the EU. Again, this result is dependent upon the agricultural productivity
assumptions and continued smooth EU access to third country sources of raw and processed biomass.
In first-generation feedstock crop activities (i.e., oilseeds, crude vegetable oil and sugar beet sectors),
whilst market impacts are more visible, particularly in the ETH scenario, the promotion of more
sustainable bioethanol production is not found to incur any stress on cereals markets. Indeed, in the
ETH scenario, there is even evidence of a redistribution of oilseeds land into cereals activities. Curiously,
the hypothesized sustainability improvement of the POE scenario is in doubt since the net oilseed land
impact at the global level is positive, which suggests that biodiesel feedstock sourced from Asia has,
on average, a lower land requirement than the rest of the world.
In the animal feed market, the loss of EU sourced protein-rich oilcake from the contraction of the
biodiesel sector is clearly observable in the AB proposal and the ETH and NoS scenarios, although
this does not carry significant marginal cost-driven implications for EU livestock producers in any
of these scenarios. Indeed, whilst there are increases in EU imports for oilcake feed of between 6%
(AB) to 14% (NoS), the trade data reveals that it does not impact significantly on the EU’s already
high dependence on protein feed imports, a sentiment echoed by [48]. Furthermore, the contraction in
non-EU region oilseed land area in the three scenarios (i.e., reduced ‘leakage’), shows that reduced
extra-EU import demand for conventional biofuel feedstocks outweighs shortfalls on the EU’s internal
market for protein-based animal feeds. This result is of interest in the currently ongoing debate on a
European strategy for the promotion of protein crops to reduce the dependency from protein imports.
Finally, under the extreme scenario of eliminating EU bioenergy support (NoS), both nascent and
conventional bioenergy sectors remain heavily dependent on EU policy support, a result supported by
other studies [27,49]. Thus, this market mechanism is an important ingredient for sustaining incomes,
employment and development in rural areas, as bioenergy (feedstock) production is especially located
in these areas. On the other hand, a macroeconomic efficiency gain is reported under NoS, although
this may provide little solace for rural livelihoods, particularly the associated frictional unemployment
impacts arising from structural changes between ‘market equilibria’.
EU energy security is also compromised under the NoS scenario, although the energy price impact
is very limited contingent upon assumptions of unfettered third-country trade access and available
compensating capacity in the EU’s wind and solar sectors. A caveat of this conclusion, however,
is that the study does not contemplate the contribution of organic and municipal biomass waste
streams in (inter alia) biogas, bio-heating and electricity, which are component parts of the NREAPs.
In terms of sustainability, NoS undoubtedly bestows beneficial environmental effects, as agricultural
land pressures, particularly in oilseeds, are relieved in all regions, although in proportional terms,
the reductions are relatively small (<5%).
As with any modelling endeavor, there are caveats, chief among them being the deterministic
(i.e., non-stochastic) behavior of agents, the assumption of equilibrium market clearing and optimal
allocation of resources in initial situation and given available technologies, the stylized representation of
investment, and the conditionality imposed on model results by the choice of model closure. A further
important omission is the lack of treatment of forestry land and associated carbon stocks, which has
pertinence when examining issues of iLUC. Finally, an improved characterization of available natural
fossil based resources, which endogenously reflect expected rates of extraction and depletion conditions
under changing market conditions (i.e., price changes), would also improve the veracity of the model
results. Despite these caveats, it is found that the features of the MAGNET model and extensions to the
new and old bio-economy sectors, makes it extremely useful to reduce uncertainties and to get insights
into pull directions of production, trade and land use changes resulting from EU bioenergy policies.
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5. Conclusions
Employing a state-of-the-art bio-based variant of the MAGNET computable general equilibrium
model, and comparing with a carefully designed medium-term status quo baseline, this study examines
four exploratory EU bioenergy policy scenarios which reflect aspects of the currently policy debate.
The aim is to re-assess the energy market implications, as well as identify and enumerate potential
resource bottlenecks, with a particular focus on economic efficiency, land use, competing biomass
availability and food security. A general conclusion is that none of the scenarios considered presents
significant challenges to EU food-security or agricultural land usage—a result which is consistent with
recent literature.
Subject to the assumptions of the study, the advanced biofuels (AB) scenario is arguably an
attractive (part-) solution from a sustainability criterion, although this policy initiative carries a notable
taxpayer cost, whilst it also diverts biomass away from higher-value bio-chemical and thermochemical
material conversion technologies.
Restricting EU conventional biofuels to bioethanol only (ETH), there are notable impacts in
associated EU bioethanol and biodiesel feedstock markets, particularly in the EU sugar markets.
On the other hand, the ETH scenario does not introduce market stresses in cereal (feedstock) markets,
in part due to the reallocation of land dedicated to oilseeds, to cereals activities. With the loss of access
to EU palm oil imports from Asia (POE), the market impacts on EU sources of crude vegetable oil and
oilseeds are mild, whilst (perhaps surprisingly) global usage of land dedicated to oilseeds rises.
Finally, the removal of all forms of bioenergy support (NoS), whilst bestowing a considerable
budgetary saving to the EU taxpayer with resulting market efficiency gains, inevitably causes some
disruption to the EU’s energy security, mainly in the electricity generation market. This market impact,
however, is compensated by capacity increases in non-biological renewable sectors and small increases
of EU imports of fossil alternatives.
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